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This paper intends to give a very general description of the ARAMIS Methodology and
to show how it answers the needs of various stakeholders concerned by the safety of
industrial plants.
ARAMIS is divided into six major steps, which will be described shortly in this paper.
The potential end users of ARAMIS are mainly the industry, the competent authorities
and the local authorities. If all of them have an interest in the same risk management
process, their needs are slightly different. Their expectations are detailed and the way
ARAMIS brings an answer is explained in this paper.
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1 Introduction
ARAMIS overall objective was to build up a new Accidental Risk Assessment
Methodology for Industries that combines the strengths of both deterministic and risk-
based approaches. It was also to provide a way to reduce or at least explain the
discrepancies of the results produced by different risk assessment approaches that wer
observed, for example in the ASSURANCE project [1]. Co-funded under the 5th EC
Framework Programme, ARAMIS was a three-year project that started in January 2002.
Four years later, the basic methodology is achieved and aims at becoming a supportive
tool to speed up the harmonised implementation of SEVESO II Directive in Europe.
This paper summarises the major features of the methodology and shows how the needs
of ARAMIS potential users are addressed.
2 Needs of potential ARAMIS users
The potential end users of ARAMIS are numerous but the most concerned are the
industry, the competent authorities and the local authorities. If all of them have an
interest in the same risk management process, their needs are slightly different. Plant
operators need a method to identify, assess and reduce the risk. This method has to be
accepted by the competent authorities. This method also has to bring useful information
about the ways to reduce the risk and to manage it daily.
The competent authorities need to be able to assess the safety level of the plant,
particularly through the safety report. They need to know why scenarios have been kept
for modelling of consequences. Both need to assess the influence of the management on
the safety level.
The plant operator has to improve its management to reduce the risk and the competent
authority to assess a true risk level which takes into account this major influencing
factor. About 80% of the major accidents have causes related with human and
organisational factors, which is a sufficient reason to take these aspects specifically into
account.
The local authorities are interested in land use planning issues. They need a clear view
about the risks or hazards the population actually faces. They also want to get
information that can be used in decision processes, which now often involve the
population. Basically, their capacity is about reducing vulnerability either by limiting
the number of targets exposed to the risk or by introducing barriers between the source
and these targets. They also need to trust the plant operator and competent authorities
when they propose risk or consequence-based contours from scenarios.
The aim of ARAMIS is to answer all these needs. It is also to make the convergence
between the deterministic and the probabilistic approaches and to resolve some
difficulties inherent to each of them [2]. As far as the deterministic approach is
concerned, the limit deals with the difficulty to justify the choices of the reference
scenarios used for land-use planning decisions. For the probabilistic approach, the
difficulty resides both in producing the probability data and in interpreting the results to
take appropriate decisions. ARAMIS does not completely solve these difficulties but
furnishes the tools and the structure to improve decision-making. It also provides a
framework for the definition of further research programs as discussed in the last
paragraph.
3 Main features of the ARAMIS methodology
ARAMIS is divided into six major steps.
1. Identification of the major accident hazards (MIMAH)
2. Definition and evaluation of safety systems
3. Assessment of the management efficiency
4. Definition of the reference accident scenarios (MIRAS)
5. Risk severity mapping from the set of Reference Accident Scenarios
6. Vulnerability mapping of the plant surroundings
A last step involves the crossing of this information for decision making
3.1 Identification of the major accident hazards (MIMAH)
MIMAH [3] is the method for the identification of major accident hazards. It is based
mainly on the use of bow-tie diagrams composed of a fault tree and an event tree. These
turned out to be a very powerful tools to communicate on risks, in particular towards
non-technicians (managers, politicians, etc.). The major input of ARAMIS was to define
a precise bow tie structure and to define precisely and exhaustively the list of
equipment, potential critical events and their consequences. The critical events were
defined to be either losses of containment for fluids or losses of physical integrity for
solids. The complete list contains twelve critical events including breach, collapse,
explosion, etc.
From a description of the plant including the chemical substances used, produced or
stored, it is possible from MIMAH to list all the critical events susceptible to occur in
the plant. For each of these critical events, MIMAH allows to identify all their
consequences in terms of secondary events and dangerous phenomena.
Then, MIMAH provides the user with a set of generic fault trees, which are based on
the most frequently observed causes. From these generic fault trees, the user will build
specific fault trees that take into account the specificity of the studied plant: types of
process used, presence of equipment, etc.
The specific fault trees are obtained mainly by the suppression of causes and
consequences which are not relevant to the context without any consideration on
probability at this stage. It is important to notice that both the fault and event trees are
considered without safety barriers, which will be defined in the next step of the method.
This has the advantage to make an explicit distinction between hazard and risk. This
first step allows the identification of hazards. The next one aims at identifying the risks
which result from the hazard scenarios and the failure of safety barriers.
3.2 An alternative to classical probabilistic approaches
Classical risk analysis methods propose to assess the probability of major accident and
to decide from this evaluation whether the risk is acceptable or not. But, during the
ARAMIS project, this calculation of the probability was shown not to be an easy task.
An inventory of the probabilistic data sources was carried out and showed that many of
the available data are not adequate for the tools developed in the first steps of the
methodology. Only very generic frequency ranges could be obtained for causes of the
critical events, which hindered the possibility to rely solely on the probability of events.
However, one main objective of ARAMIS was to valorise through contextual frequency
data the efforts made by the operators both in prevention and mitigation.
An alternative method was developed, which focuses on generic values for safety
systems and clear guidelines to lower the final frequency of identified scenarios. First, it
aims at helping the user with the definition of the safety requirements applying to the
plant. Then, the method helps the user to define the safety barriers [4] by promoting the
concept of safety function and by providing different possible strategies of barrier
implementation for a given safety function.
33 Defining the safety requirements
As it can be understood from the previous paragraph, the definition of the safety
requirements is a keystone of the ARAMIS methodology. The proposed method is
inspired by the IEC 61508 standard [5]. The idea is to guide the user in the
identification of the risk reduction goals that should be associated with different
scenarios. This approach has a triple interest. It helps the user improving the
management of risks by defining clear targets. It helps the competent authorities
checking the risk reduction measures. It provides an evaluation of the residual risks. The
way it was built also reduces the stress put on the quality of probability values.
Once this work carried out in risk analysis, the resulting dangerous phenomena can be
ranked according to their classes of probability and consequences in a Risk Matrix
where acceptable risk levels are defined.
3.4 Assessing the influence of safety management and safety culture
The safety management has a strong influence on the capacity to control the risk. Here
again, the interest of ARAMIS is to provide tools to assess the safety management
system (SMS) and the safety culture and to take them into account to help the operators
identify the opportunities for improvement. The approach in ARAMIS [6] consists in
devising a process-oriented audit protocol focusing on the activities relating to the life
cycle of the safety barriers including design, installation, use, maintenance and
improvement activities. For each, ten important structural elements are evaluated as
requirements for the SMS. The outcomes of the audit are then combined with the results
of a safety climate questionnaire collected from employees in order to get a contextual
level of confidence, in particular regarding behavioural barriers. The questionnaire is
made up of eight cultural factors that characterise a company's safety culture.
• learning and willingness to report • felt responsibility
• safety prioritisation, rules and • trust and fairness
compliance
• leadership involvement and • work team atmosphere and
commitment support
• risk and human performance • motivation, influence and
limitation perception involvement
From the previous step, each type of barrier was given a generic level of confidence
indexed on its probability of failure on demand. These indicative values require then to
be adjusted from the local context where they are implemented and maintained. For
instance for a behavioural barrier, the generic confidence in the barrier is adjusted
depending on whether the operator knows the stakes of his actions, or his decisions
require complex diagnosis, conflict with production. The aim of the project was also to
aggregate the results from the auditing and questionnaires into a final score for adjusting
-possibly lowering- the generic values into contextual ones.
This link and the whole scoring process was obviously an ambitious goal and still needs
to be worked out. The case studies already helped getting some benchmark between
different types of management and enabled eventually to propose a set of "minimum
requirements" for both the culture and management system in order to anchor a first
scoring scale. This remains however an important area of research.
3.5 Risk severity assessment and mapping
Each reference accident scenario (RAS) is defined by an initiating event that leads to a
critical event, which can potentially lead to different dangerous phenomena. For each
phenomenon, a severity index SDp has been defined [7] in a single scale ranging from 0
to 100 according to its intensity which varies with the distance from the plant.
For each RAS the risk severity is defined for one scenario as the combination of the
probability of the phenomena with their specific severity SDPJ. Risk severity can be
represented for each scenario in a geographical way, as a function SRAs(d) of the
distance from the source term.
A final mapping of risk severity considering all RAS is then obtained by multiplying the
frequency of each RAS with its specific risk severity index.
Risk severity mapping as it is defined provides an innovative way to aggregate the
information for a decision-maker to elaborate relative priorities for land-use or
emergency planning purposes. However, the range of values obtained with such an
approach still requires to be interpreted and the decision making process to be adapted
to this new approach.
3.6 Assessing the vulnerability
The last innovative attempt from ARAMIS is to address the vulnerability of the
environment independently of the hazardous site [8]. This has the fundamental interest
of allowing the local authorities to take useful decisions to reduce the global risk level
by reducing the vulnerability whereas the plant operator only can act on the potential
hazard or risk of the installation.
The vulnerability is calculated on the basis of a multicriteria decision-aiding approach.
With the development of new ways of governance involving local population in risk-
informed decisions, the main interest of this approach is to base the vulnerability study
on stakeholder risk perception through expert judgement elicitation. On a given spot of
the environment, the vulnerability is thus characterised by the number of potential
targets and their relative vulnerability to different phenomena. The global vulnerability
is a linear combination of each target vulnerability to each type of effect for the various
types of impacts.
4 Conclusion
The ARAMIS methodology was briefly described in this paper. It aims at offering an
alternative way to the traditional risk-based and consequence-based methodologies for
risk analysis by providing a series of integrated tools. These were designed to answer
the specific needs of potential ARAMIS users who are industry, competent authorities
and the local authorities. They were also elaborated to solve some of the difficulties
raised by the lack of reliable data, namely concerning the accident frequencies. By
promoting the barrier approach, ARAMIS helps the users defining the safety
requirements, which apply to a plant, and therefore helps the competent authorities
verifying the explicit control of risk by the operator. This approach also enables an easy
and explicit identification of the reference accident scenarios, making the
communication between the stakeholders easier or at least more straightforward and
structured. The same applies to the approaches of the severity and the vulnerability,
which are exploited through a clearly understandable spatial representation.
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